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TRADE REMEDY LITIGATION -
CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW
LAWRENCE R. WALDERS AND NEIL C. PRATT*
The topic for this year's Judicial Conference is "Globalization."
A key element of globalization is the increasing influence of
international organizations on U.S. foreign trade law. This
influence is particularly evident in judicial review of
administrative determinations under the antidumping and
countervailing duty ("AD/CVD") laws.1 Respondents in AD/CVD
cases now have available a variety of fora in which they may
attack or defend decisions of the Department of Commerce
("Commerce") and the International Trade Commission ("ITC").
They may select the traditional route under U.S. law by filing or
intervening in lawsuits before the Court of International Trade
("CIT"'). Alternatively, if the case involves imports from Canada
or Mexico, the respondent may file a lawsuit before a panel under
Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA").2 Finally, a respondent may also persuade the
government of the exporting country to challenge the decision
before a World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute settlement
panel. Each procedure offers advantages and drawbacks, which
will be discussed in this paper.
A related issue is the interaction of the laws of the three
jurisdictions. While the choice of forum determines the choice of
law, to what extent can or should the decisions of a WTO or
NAFTA panel influence the decisions of the CIT? The issue has
* Presented at the 12th Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade on
November 13, 2002. Mr. Walders is Senior Counsel with the Washington, D.C. office of
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP. Mr. Pratt is an Associate with the Washington, D.C.
office of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP.
1 See generally Harvey M. Applebaum, Antitrust and U.S. Trade Law: Antitrust
Aspects of Trade Law Cases, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1981) (explaining both antidumping
and countervailing duty laws).
2 See Patrick Macrory, Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA: A Surprising Record of
Success, C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. 168 (Sept. 2002) (discussing how Chapter 19 of
NAFTA deals with antidumping and countervailing duty actions), available at
http://www.cdhowe.com/pdf/commentary-168.pdf (last visited August 8, 2003).
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arisen in only a few cases so far, but it is likely to arise more
frequently in the future as the United States faces increasing
challenges to its AD/CVD decisions.
These issues were the topic of an interesting panel discussion
at the Eleventh Judicial Conference of the Court of International
Trade held on December 7, 1999. The panelists presented a
fascinating hypothetical case involving a challenge to an
antidumping determination on imports of "soccer bounce balls"
from Mexico. The issue was whether the imported bounce balls
were the same product as standard soccer balls that are produced
in the U.S., and whether the U.S. producers of standard soccer
balls had standing to file an antidumping petition against
imports of the bounce balls. The litigation bounced from forum to
forum as the parties contested and defended the antidumping
determination in the CIT, NAFTA, and the WTO, with each
producing conflicting outcomes. 3
The questions raised by the panelists have not been resolved in
the three years that have elapsed since the Eleventh Judicial
Conference. Meanwhile the issues of choice of forum and choice
of law have taken on greater significance with the growing
globalization of international trade litigation.
I. CHOICE OF FORUM
A. CIT or NAFTA?
Parties that want to contest agency decisions in AD/CVD cases
involving imports from Canada or Mexico have the choice of filing
suit in the CIT or bringing their case before a bi-national panel
established under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA.4 As discussed
further below, foreign producers may also request their
government to initiate a WTO panel review. While the WTO
process can proceed independently of the CIT or NAFTA
litigation, the same is not true with respect to litigation before
3 For a complete description of the bounce ball saga, see Elizabeth C. Seastrum &
Myles S. Getlan, The Globalization of International Trade Litigation: AD/CVD Litigation-
Which Forum and Which Law?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 893, 895 (2001) (discussing
antidumping determinations).
4 See Canada: Trade Union, LEGAL WEEK GLOBAL, Aug. 20, 2002 (explaining how bi-
national panels are selected and their authority), available at http://www.legalweekglobal.
net/ViewItem.asp?id=10248&Keyword=.
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the CIT or a NAFTA panel. Once a party requests a NAFTA
panel review, the CIT is divested of its jurisdiction, and it must
dismiss any litigation that has been initiated regarding the same
administrative determination that is the subject of the NAFTA
panel review. The following factors should be considered in
choosing between the CIT and a NAFTA panel.
1. The CIT:
Filing a summons and complaint pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1516a commences an action in the CIT.5 The Court can issue an
injunction preventing liquidation of the entries pending a final
judgment in the case. 6 The Court determines whether the
challenged administrative determination is supported by
substantial evidence or is otherwise in accordance with the law.
In so doing, it applies the Chevron7 two step standard of judicial
review, whereby an agency's determination receives considerable
deference:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has spoken
directly to the precise question at issue .... If a court,
employing traditional rules of statutory construction
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect. [Second, if] the court determines that Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue ... if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
question at issue [then the issue before the court is] whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statue, [that is whether the agency's interpretation is
reasonable or rational and consistent with the statute] .8
If the Court rules in favor of the plaintiff, it will remand the
case to the agency for reconsideration in accordance with the
5 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(discussing the procedure for instituting an action in the CIT under § 1516a); FY 2004
Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Justice, State and the
Judiciary of the Comm. On House Appropriations, (2003) (testimony of Gregory W.
Carman Chief Judge) (defining Court of International Trade).
6 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(discussing four factors to be considered in granting preliminary injunctive relief under
equity).
7 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)
(establishing standard of review to be applied to administrative agencies).
8 Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
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Court's decision. The agency issues a draft redetermination and
provides an opportunity for comment by the parties. It then
issues a final redetermination, which is subject to additional
comment by the parties in briefing to the Court. The Court
ultimately issues a final judgment and order, which can be
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC"). The CAFC will sustain, reverse, or remand the
decision to the CIT, which may in turn remand the case to the
agency for further consideration in light of the CAFC decision.
After a final judgment is issued in the case, the suspended
entries are liquidated in accordance with the final judgment.
The benefit of this procedure is that it will ultimately result in
a judgment that will provide direct relief for the prevailing party.
The final judgment can result in revocation of an antidumping or
countervailing duty order or at least a reduction in the dumping
or subsidy margin that will entitle a winning respondent to a
refund of cash deposits plus interest running from the date of
entry to the date of liquidation. A winning petitioner can get
reinstitution of a previously revoked order, an increase in the
AD/CVD margin, and assessment of AD/CVD duties. The
assessment can also result in cash payments to the petitioner
under the Byrd Amendment. 9
The main detriment is time. While the parties to CIT litigation
are subject to various deadlines imposed by the statute, the
orders of the trial judge, and the CIT rules, the CIT itself, as an
Article III court, is not subject to any deadlines. Once a case is
submitted for judgment, after all of the briefs have been filed,
oral argument has been held, and the record is closed, there is no
deadline on the Court's decision. The time required depends on
the complexity of the case and the workload and predilection of
the individual judge. Some decisions are issued quickly while
9 See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2003).
Payments to petitioners pursuant to the Byrd amendment seem likely to continue despite
the WTO Appellate Body's finding that that the Byrd Amendment violates WTO
obligations. See United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). Specifically, although the Bush
administration has indicated that it will seek to comply with the Appellate Body's
decision, repeal of the Byrd amendment is unlikely given the strong support for the Byrd
Amendment in the U.S. Senate. See Letter from 69 Senators to President Bush, available
at http://www.gbdinc.org/pdfs/CDSOA.Senate.ltr.2.04.pdf (Feb. 4, 2003) (opposing repeal
of the Byrd amendment).
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others may take years. Even after the initial decision is issued,
remands require further delays at the administrative and
judicial levels. Appeals to the CAFC entail additional years of
delay.
2. NAFTA Panels:
The NAFTA panel route appears to avoid the potential delay of
CIT litigation, given the strict deadlines that NAFTA
proceedings are subject to under Chapter 19.10 The entire
process from filing a request for panel review to the issuance of
the panel decision must be completed within 315 days. This
deadline, however, is honored more in the breach than in the
observance. In fact, many panel decisions are issued well beyond
the 315-day deadline, and the delays have been increasing in
recent years.
The primary problem is selection of the panels. While NAFTA
itself expresses a preference for using active and retired judges,11
most NAFTA panels consist of private lawyers who practice
international trade law. Service on NAFTA panels by private
lawyers can present conflicts problems. Even if the prospective
panelists and other members of their law firms have no
relationship with the parties to the case, participation on NAFTA
panels can present "issue conflicts." While NAFTA panel
decisions have no formal precedential value, a private lawyer
may feel constrained from taking a position as a panelist that
could be cited by an opponent in a later case. Apart from the
possibility of issue conflicts, members of law firms are also aware
that their participation as panelists could prevent their firm from
representing parties to the panel proceeding in other matters.
These concerns have made it difficult to recruit panelists and
delayed the establishment of such panels.
Unlike the CIT (or for that matter WTO panels), the decisions
of NAFTA panels ordinarily are not appealable. Chapter 19
allows for appeals from panel rulings ("Extraordinary
Challenges") only in the following narrowly limited
circumstances:
10 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.,-Mex.,-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (discussing Chapter 19 deadlines) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
11 See NAFTA, art. 1901(2)(1), 32 I.L.M. 687 (1993) (discussing NAFTA panels).
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(1) a panel member was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or
a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated
the rules of conduct;
(2) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(3) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or
jurisdiction; and
(4) any of these actions has materially affected the panel's
decision and threatens the integrity of the panel process.12
So far there has been only one extraordinary challenge in the
history of the NAFTA.13
Another issue to consider in selecting a forum is that NAFTA
panels, unlike the CIT, cannot vacate determinations of
Commerce or the ITC, but they do have the power to remand
decisions to the agencies for further action consistent with the
panel decisions. Some cases have resulted in multiple remands.
As a practical matter remands will eventually result in a decision
that complies with the panel's decision. Thus, a NAFTA panel's
determination has the same force of law in the United States as a
decision by the CIT. Accordingly, a successful plaintiff before a
NAFTA panel can obtain direct benefits in the form of revocation,
refunds of cash deposits or reductions of estimated AD/CVD
duties on later entries.
However, a major difference between the CIT and a NAFTA
panel decision is that the effect of the panel decision is limited to
the specific administrative determination that is before the
panel. In short, decisions of NAFTA panels have no stare decisis
effect. They are not binding on the DOC or ITC in later
proceedings, and are not cited as precedent by the CIT. This lack
of precedential effect can have adverse practical consequences for
12 See Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Procedure or Only A Two-Stage
Process? A Comparative View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 193, 208 (1999) (citing enumerative list of
different allegations a party can bring to attention of committee).
13 See Antidumping Duty Order: Gray Portland Cement & Clinker from Mexico, 55
Fed. Reg. 35,443 (Aug. 30, 1990) (citing Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC)
Proceeding relating to USA-97-1904-01 panel review).
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the parties in the case. While the agency must comply with a
NAFTA panel remand order in one case, it is not bound to follow
the panel decision in any other case, even one that involves the
same AD or CVD order.
This fact was forcefully brought home in Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, Decision of the Panel
on the Second Redetermination on Remand.14 There Commerce
complied with the panel's instructions. However, it stated that it
disagreed with the panel's interpretation of the law and indicated
that it will disregard the panel's decision in future cases. The
panel pointed out that if the CIT had interpreted the law in the
same manner as the panel, and if the CIT were upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Commerce would be
bound by the judicial interpretation. But in this case, Commerce
made it clear that it would reject the panel's interpretation in
future proceedings including administrative reviews in the same
case. Thus, the Canadian producer would have to litigate the
same issue before other NAFTA panels in each succeeding
administrative review or file suit in the CIT with an appeal to
the CAFC to obtain a binding decision that Commerce would be
forced to follow in the future. 15
B. CIT/NAFTA Panel or WTO
There is no either-or choice of forum between the CIT (or
NAFTA), and the WTO in AD/CVD cases. The choice of one
forum does not preclude the choice of the other. Both avenues
can be pursued as long as the case involves issues under both
U.S. law and the WTO AD/CVD agreements. A case at the CIT
or before a NAFTA panel involving U.S. law can, and often does,
14 Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Canada, Decision of the
Panel on the Second Determination on Remand, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/nafta/english/us97430e.asp (Sept. 13,1999).
15 True to its word, Commerce has disregarded the panel's finding in each subsequent
administrative review, thus forcing the respondent to relitigate the same issue before new
NAFTA panels with the same result. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Canada; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review in
Accordance with North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Decision, 68
Fed. Reg. 27,529 (May 20, 2003); Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Canada; Notice of Amended Final Results of Administrative Review in Accordance
with North American Free Trade Agreement Panel Decision, 66 Fed. Reg. 52,095 (Oct. 12,
2001).
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implicate the WTO as well. The procedures and the
consequences, however, are quite different.
1.WTO Dispute Resolution
WTO dispute settlement proceeds according to a schedule set
forth in the Dispute Settlement Agreement.16 The procedures
begin with a request for consultations, which must be initiated
within 30 days of the request. If the consultations fail to settle a
dispute within 60 days of such request, the complaining party
may request the establishment of a panel. The Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") establishes a panel during the first
meeting of the DSB following the first meeting when the panel
request is on the agenda. If the parties cannot agree on the
panelists, the WTO Director-General will establish the panel.
The panel proceeding itself entails two meetings (hearings) with
the parties and one meeting with third parties that have an
interest in the dispute. The panel issues its report to the parties
within six months of its establishment, and the panel report is
circulated to the DSB within the next three months after it is
translated into each of the WTO official languages - English,
French, and Spanish. The DSB adopts the report within 60 days
unless there is an appeal to the Appellate Body. The appellate
review process takes 90 days, after which the report of the
Appellate Body is adopted by the DSB.
While the deadlines are relatively precise, the actual time
required varies depending on disagreements over the composition
of the panels and the complexity of the cases. According to the
most recent statistics reported by WorldTradeLaw.net, the
average time between the establishment of the panels and
circulation of the final panel report is 366.77 days. 17
Article 17.5 of the DSU provides that Appellate Body
proceedings should not exceed 60 days from the date a party to
the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal. The Appellate
16 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU') (establishing rules and procedures
applying to disputes), at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/dsu.pdf (last visited
Aug. 11, 2003).
17 See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/paneltiming.asp (for the most up-
to-date statistics).
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Body will notify the DSB if it cannot meet the 60-day deadline,
but it will receive no more than a 30-day extension.18
In contrast to the explicit time limits in the panel and
Appellate Body procedures, the time frame for implementation of
WTO decisions is open-ended and uncertain. Within 30 days of
the panel or appellate report's adoption, the losing party must
notify the DSB whether it intends to implement the report and
when it intends to do so. The losing party normally requests a
"reasonable period of time" for implementation, which is set by
negotiation or by arbitration. Six months after the establishment
of the reasonable period of time, the losing party must submit
reports on the progress in implementation. These reports must
continue, "until the issue is resolved."19 Resolution may take
years. In EC-Bananas, the EC submitted implementation
reports for more than two years after the establishment of the
reasonable period of time. 20
Unlike decisions of U.S. courts, the WTO has no power to
compel compliance with its decisions. WTO members, as
sovereign nations, have the right to decide whether and how to
comply with WTO decisions. If the losing party fails to comply, it
may be required to pay compensation in the form of tariff
concessions, or the winning party may be entitled to retaliate
against imports from the losing party. However, the question of
whether a losing party has failed to comply, and if so whether
and to what extent the winning party may be entitled to
compensation or retaliation must be decided in a separate
proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU.21 Article 21.5
proceedings are conducted under an accelerated 90-day schedule
by the same panel that heard the original case. Article 21.5
Panel decisions can be appealed to the Appellate Body.
18 See id. (stating that "[iln no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.").
19 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 21.6, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/dsu.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
20 See generally Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me, Pull-
You: The Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32
INT'L LAW. 755, 776-81 (1998) (discussing implementation process in EC - Bananas).
21 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 21.5, available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/dsu.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (stating that
"[w]here there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel.").
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Ultimately, if the losing party is found to have failed to
implement the original decision, the winning party may seek
compensation or retaliation under Article 22 of the DSU. In the
absence of an agreement between the parties, the DSB will grant
authorization to retaliate within 30 days of the expiration of the
reasonable period of time. However, if the losing party objects to
the level of retaliation, the matter will be referred to an
arbitrator who will then determine whether the level of proposed
retaliation is equivalent to the level of harm incurred by the
winning party. The arbitrator's decision is due within 60 days
after the expiration of the reasonable period of time, and is
binding on the parties. WTO agreements, including those on
dispute settlement, are not self-implementing in the United
States. U.S. law will prevail in the event of a conflict with the
agreements as interpreted by a panel or AB report.
Implementation of WTO decisions is governed by Section 129 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA").22 Section 129(a)
applies to implementation of panel or Appellate Body reports
relating to decisions of the ITC. The U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") is responsible for implementation, but the USTR
cannot issue direct orders to the ITC because the Commission is
an independent agency that is not part of the Executive Branch.
Instead, Section 129(a) provides that the USTR may request the
ITC to issue an advisory opinion as to whether the U.S.
antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards laws permit the
ITC to modify its decision in a particular proceeding in a manner
that would render its action "not inconsistent with" the findings
of the panel or Appellate Body. The USTR must notify the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees of any such
request. The ITC must make its report within 30 days of the
USTR request in the case of a panel decision and 21 days after
the request in the case of an Appellate Body decision. Since it is
an advisory opinion, the ITC report is not subject to judicial
review. If a majority of the Commission concludes that U.S. law
would permit it to modify its decision in a manner that is "not
inconsistent with" the panel or Appellate Body decision, the
USTR will consult with the Finance and Ways and Means
22 See H.R. 5110, 104th Cong. § 129 (1994) (outlining actions taken following issuance
of a report by WTO).
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Committees to decide whether to ask the Commission to make a
new determination. The ITC will then have 120 days to issue a
new determination. If, as a result, the Commission issues a
negative injury determination regarding imports from one or
more of the subject countries, the USTR will instruct Commerce
to revoke the order with respect to those imports.23
Section 129(b) governs implementation of WTO decisions
relating to Commerce Department proceedings. After consulting
with the Finance and Ways and Means Committees, the USTR
may direct Commerce to make a determination that is "not
inconsistent with" the panel or Appellate Body report.
Commerce has 120 days to make the determination.
The practical consequences for the parties vary depending on
the case. Panel or Appellate Body reports cannot be
implemented by administrative action if the result would be
contrary to U.S. law. Thus, if the panel or Appellate Body finds
that a U.S. law is inconsistent with a WTO agreement, the report
can only be implemented by amending the U.S. law. 24 To date,
most of the panel or Appellate Body rulings against the United
States have involved administrative determinations in individual
cases, or administrative practices or regulations rather than
provisions of the AD/CVD laws themselves. Implementation of
those reports has been handled administratively by Commerce or
the ITC.
If a panel or Appellate Body rules in favor of the complaining
party it cannot order specific remedial action such as refunds of
AD/CVD duties or revocation of orders. Instead, it can only
"recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into
conformity with that agreement."25 The most that the panel or
Appellate Body can do is to "suggest ways in which the Member
23 In safeguards cases, the President is authorized to reduce, modify, or terminate
the safeguards action after receiving the ITC determination and consulting with the
Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees. See generally 217 F. Supp. 2d
1347 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) (discussing the President's power in a safeguards case).
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2003). See generally United States - Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.
net/reports/wtoab/us-fsc(ab).pdf (Feb. 24, 2000) (considering complaint raised by EC over§§ 921-927 of IRC as applied to Foreign Sales Corporations); United States - Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net
reports/wtoab/us-1916act(ab).pdf (Aug. 28, 2000) (addressing continuing validity of
Antidumping Act of 1916).
25 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 19.1, available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/dsu.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
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concerned could implement the agreement."26 The manner of
implementation is left to the discretion of the offending country.
This open-ended approach has led to disputes over
implementation, which result in further proceedings under
Article 21.5 of the DSU.
Nevertheless, decisions of WTO panels in some cases leave
little room for discretion in the mode of implementation. Several
cases have resulted in findings that specific U.S. statutory
provisions were inconsistent with WTO agreements. In such
cases, the only way that the United States can "bring its measure
into conformity with the agreement" is to amend or repeal the
law. 27
The first test of this approach in the antidumping context arose
in the WTO challenge to the Antidumping Act of 1916.28 The
Appellate Body ruled that it had jurisdiction under GATT Article
VI and the AD Agreement to adjudicate claims challenging the
1916 Act "as such," outside the context of a specific application of
the law.29 It found that the 1916 Act was inconsistent with GATT
Article VI and Articles 4 and 5 of the AD Agreement because the
1916 Act imposes damages and civil and criminal penalties for
dumping, while the GATT and AD Agreement only authorize the
assessment of additional duties. During the panel proceedings
the EC submitted that the United States had acted in manner
inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO, when it failed to
repeal the 1916 Act.30 The panel implicitly acknowledged that
Article 19.1 of the DSU limits its authority to recommending that
the Member concerned bring its measure into conformity with
the WTO agreements. However, the panel went on to add that it
had the authority to suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the panel's recommendations.31 It
then noted that "one way" for the United States to bring the 1916
26 Id.
27 See e.g., United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/ABIR, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us- 1916act(ab).pdf (Aug. 28, 2000)
(recommending that "United States ... bring the 1916 Act into conformity with its
obligations under the WTO agreement").
28 See id. (challenging validity of 1916 Antidumping Act).
29 See id. at 28 (indicating agreement with panel's findings of jurisdiction).
30 See United States -Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTDS136/R, 1.1 (Mar. 31, 2000).
31 See id. at 6.207, n.446 (noting that pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the panel
is "entitled to suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the Panel's
recommendations").
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Act into conformity with its WTO obligations would be to repeal
the Act.32 The USTR agreed to implement the decision by asking
Congress to repeal the statute, but Congress has not yet
complied.
The United States and the complaining parties (Japan and the
EU) could not agree on a timetable for implementation, so the
case went to arbitration under Article 129, and the arbitrator
ruled that the decision must be implemented within 10 months.
The United States was required to implement the decision (i.e. to
repeal the law) no later than December 31, 2001. A bill to repeal
the 1916 Act was introduced last year but it has never moved
past committee. The Bush Administration failed to persuade
conferees on the Trade Promotion Authority Bill ("TPA") to add
language repealing the 1916 Act. Thus the United States is in
continued violation of its WTO commitments with respect to the
1916 Act, and Japan and the EU have the right to retaliate or to
seek compensation. The impact on trade is limited because no
plaintiff has yet prevailed in a 1916 Act case. Barring a repeal of
the law (which seems unlikely) Japan and the EU may retaliate
by enacting similar legislation directed against the United
States.
The 1916 Act will probably remain on the books as a potential
source of legal harassment, and the WTO process will have
provided no relief to persons adversely affected by the U.S.
failure to comply with its WTO obligations.
The recent decision in United States-Anti-Dumping Measures
on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,33 presents
another example of a direct conflict between U.S. law and a WTO
agreement. The Appellate Body upheld a panel finding that a
U.S. statutory provision requiring the inclusion of margins based
on partial "facts available" in calculating the "all others" rate (the
rate that applies to companies that were not investigated) is
inconsistent with Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement. 34 This ruling
32 See id. at 6.207
33 United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WT/DS/184/AB/R, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.netreports/wtoab/us-
hotrolled(ab).pdf (July 24, 2001).
34 See id. at 4 (noting the Panel's finding that Section 735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, "mandates that USDOC exclude only margins based entirely on
facts available in determining an all others rate, is inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the AD
Agreement .. ").
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left Commerce in a quandary as to how to determine an "all
others" rate when all of the individual margins are calculated on
the basis of partial facts available. The Appellate Body did not
resolve the quandary, ruling that the issue was not before them.
During the House-Senate conference on the TPA Bill, the Bush
Administration failed to persuade the conferees to amend the
statute. Thus, this issue remains unresolved and private
litigants have obtained no benefit from the WTO decision.
While the process eventually produces a final decision that
vindicates the rights of the complaining WTO member, there
may be little or no practical benefit for the private parties
affected. The potential results for private parties range from
complete victory (e.g., when the WTO decision is implemented by
revoking an antidumping duty order) to complete loss (e.g., when
the losing party chooses to grant concessions on other products or
to incur retaliation rather than complying with the WTO
decision).
As of now, there have been few instances where the United
States has actually implemented WTO decisions involving
antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings, and the results
offer little comfort for respondents. These cases demonstrate
that Commerce will interpret panel decisions as narrowly as
possible.
The first case involved implementation of a panel report
regarding Commerce's refusal to revoke the antidumping duty
order on DRAMs from Korea.35 The panel ruled that by requiring
proof that revocation is "not likely" to lead to a resumption of
dumping, Commerce failed to comply with Article 11 of the
Antidumping Agreement. 36 Commerce implemented the decision
by deleting the "not likely" language from the regulation and
providing that the Secretary will revoke an antidumping order
unless he finds that continued imposition of antidumping duties
is necessary to offset dumping. Applying the new standard to the
same set of facts, Commerce reached the same conclusion and
refused to revoke the order. Korea complained to the DSB that
the United States had failed to comply with the panel decision,
35 See United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit and Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R, available
at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/wto/ds99/99r.asp (Jan. 29, 1999).
36 See id. at 6.51.
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but the case was settled when Commerce revoked the order in a
sunset review after petitioner Micron Technology notified
Commerce that it was no longer interested in continuation of the
order.
A similar result was reached in United States-Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom.37 The
panel and the Appellate Body ruled that the United States
violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Measures (SCM Agreement) by applying an irrebutable
presumption that subsidies granted to government-owned
companies are passed through to private buyers when the
companies are privatized. Commerce avoided the need to
implement this ruling when the CVD order was revoked in a
sunset review. However, the same issue was raised in other
cases, and a WTO panel recently ruled that the U.S. statutory
provision on privatization and the determinations in twelve CVD
cases are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. 38
The most recent example of Commerce's approach toward
implementation of WTO rulings involves the Appellate Body
report in United States-Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan.39 The Appellate Body ruled
that the U.S. "arm's-length" test for determining whether sales to
affiliated parties are made in the ordinary course of trade
violates Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.40 Under the
arm's-length test, Commerce automatically disregards sales to
affiliated parties that are, on average, less than 99.5 percent of
37 United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/ABR
(May 10, 2000), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-
leadbars(ab).pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2003).
38 See United States-Countervailing Duty Measures Concerning Certain Products
from the European Communities, WT/DS212[R (July 31, 2002) (finding that such
provisions are not consistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Measures), available at http://www.wto.int/wto/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/212r-e.doc. (last
visited Aug. 11, 2003).
39 United States-Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/wtoab/us-hotrolled(ab).pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2003).
40 United States-Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan WT/DS184/AB/R, at 157-58, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
wtoab/us-hotrolled(ab).pdf (July 24, 2001) (indicating "arm's length" test violates Article
2.1 of Antidumping Agreement).
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the price charged to unaffiliated customers. 41 However, high
priced sales to affiliates are only excluded where the respondent
meets the amorphous burden of showing that such sales were
priced aberationally or artificially high. The Appellate Body
ruled that Commerce violated Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement by
automatically rejecting sales to affiliated parties at prices that
fall below the 99.5 percent threshold while using higher priced
sales to affiliated parties unless respondents can demonstrate
that the prices are aberrational. Instead of conducting a broader
reexamination of the rationale for the arm's-length test
Commerce focused on the Appellate Body's requirement of "even-
handedness" and implemented the ruling by modifying its
current standard.42 Under Commerce's revised arm's-length test
sales to affiliated parties at prices that are not within a band of
98 percent to 102 percent of the prices charged to unaffiliated
customers are deemed to have been made outside the ordinary
course of trade.43
Even if the United States ultimately implements a WTO
decision, any changes in the results of individual cases will have
no retrospective effect. Section 129(c)(1) provides that if
Commerce or the ITC revise an AD/CVD determination, the
revised determinations have prospective effect only.44  The
revised determinations apply only to unliquidated entries of
merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for
consumption on or after the date on which the USTR directs
implementation. The SAA points out that the relief available
under Section 129(c)(1) is distinguishable from relief available in
an action brought before the CIT or NAFTA bi-national panel
because the CIT or the panel can provide retroactive relief.45
41 See id. at 149-52 (discussing the 99.5 Percent Test).
42 See id. at 154 (stating "[tihere is a lack of even-handedness in the two tests
applied by the United States").
43 See Antidumping Proceedings: Affiliated Party Sales in the Ordinary Course of
Trade, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,186 (Nov. 15 2002). The U.S. has not indicated how it will
implement other Appellate Body rulings in this case regarding the captive production
provision, the use of facts available dumping margins in calculating the all others rate,
and the need for separate evaluation of injury caused by factors other than the dumped
imports.
44 See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 5338(c)(1) (2003) (stating
effects of determinations, notice of implementation).
45 See Statement of Administrative Action, in Message from the President
Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., Vol. I at 1026, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4040, 4313.
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II. CHOICE OF LAW AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF
FORUM
A. CIT or NAFTA?
In choosing between the CIT and NAFTA, choice of law is not a
factor. NAFTA panels, just like the CIT, are subject to U.S. law,
and, as noted above, a panel's determination has the same force
of law regarding that specific dispute as if the CIT had issued the
opinion. More significantly, from a choice of law perspective, a
NAFTA panel owes Commerce and the ITC the same level of
deference under Chevron as that given by the CIT.
B. CIT/NAFTA or the WTO?
The WTO DSB seeks merely to interpret and apply the AD
Agreement. Although the URAA was intended to bring U.S. law
into conformity with the AD Agreement, this has not always
proved to be the case. Moreover, the WTO Agreements are not
self-implementing under U.S. law, and where there is a direct
conflict between U.S. law and the WTO Agreements, U.S. law
prevails. Even where U.S. law is silent or ambiguous, the CIT or
NAFTA panel is still prone to affirm Commerce's or the ITC's
determination on the grounds that the determination is
reasonable under the second step of Chevron. A WTO panel or
Appellate Body, however, is not concerned with deference either
to Congress or Commerce, but is free to examine whether the
country subject to investigation has acted in a manner that is
inconsistent with the AD or SCM Agreement. Thus in those
situations where there is a direct conflict between U.S. law and
the Agreement, the only forum in which a plaintiff may be able to
obtain some relief is before the WTO.
But what if the action is based on challenging Commerce's or
the ITC's practice in implementing the URAA? In this scenario,
one is not concerned with a conflict between U.S. law and the
WTO Agreement, but rather with the manner in which
Commerce or ITC applies U.S. law, and whether this application
is consistent with the Agreement. As noted above, the CIT has
tended to uphold Commerce's practice unless shown to be
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unreasonable under the second step of Chevron.46 Pursuant to
this standard, the CIT has, for example, repeatedly upheld
Commerce's arm's-length test,47 and yet this same practice was
found impermissible under Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement by a
WTO panel and Appellate Body in 2001.48 The main reason for
this difference in outcome between cases at the CIT and the WTO
is the legal regime, and the deference shown thereunder, in the
two different fora.
One further issue that plays into the selection of forum is
whether the panel or Appellate Body's report will have any
precedential value under U.S. law. As yet this question remains
largely undecided because the CIT has only considered this issue
in a few cases. To the extent, however, that a successful
determination in a WTO case may add weight to a plaintiffs
claim before the CIT, there may be additional benefits in
persuading one's government to initiate an action against the
United States before the WTO.
Pursuant to the Charming Betsy doctrine, it is well established
that U.S. law should be interpreted in a manner that is
consistent with U.S. international obligations. 49 If U.S. law
mandates that an agency act in a manner that is incompatible
with U.S. international obligations, the CIT/NAFTA panel
reviewing the agency's determination has no option but to apply
U.S. law. Where, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, or
the agency determination is based on discretion rather than
statutory requirement, the CIT and NAFTA panel should, under
46 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (discussing the second step of determination of whether an agency's answer is
based on a reasonable construction of a statute).
47 See Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 C.I.T. 829, 846 (1995) ('This court will
uphold the test that Commerce selects to measure whether sales to related parties were
at arm's length, unless that test is shown to be unreasonable."); NTN Bearing Corp. of
America v. United States, 19 C.I.T. 1221, 1241 (1995) (discussing the reasonableness test
similar to that in Micron); Usinor Sacilor v. United States, 18 C.I.T. 1155, 1158 (1994)
(stating court will uphold the arm's length test unless it is unreasonable).
48 See United States-Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan, WT[DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) (stating application of 99.5 percent test
"does note rest on a permissible interpretation of the term 'sales in the ordinary course of
trade").
49 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (holding "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains.").
TRADE REMEDY LITIGATION
the second step of Chevron, seek to interpret U.S. AD law in a
manner that is consistent with U.S. international obligations.50
The CIT has ruled that the AD Agreement is an international
obligation, which is, therefore, subject to the Charming Betsy
doctrine. 51 However, a WTO panel or Appellate Body's
construction of the AD Agreement has "no binding effect on the
Court."52 The Court stated in Hyundai that Congress has
"provided that the response to an adverse WTO panel report is
the province of the executive branch and, more particularly, the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative."53 As such, it would be
inappropriate for the CIT to become involved in the
implementation of a WTO Report that implicates political
decisions.54
However, merely because a WTO panel report is not binding on
the CIT, does not mean that the panel report has no weight at
the CIT. Indeed, the Court in Hyundai specifically noted that its
determination on this matter should not be read "to imply that a
panel report serves no purpose in litigation before the court. To
the contrary, a panel's reasoning, if sound, may be used to inform
the court's decision."55
In Hyundai the CIT considered whether Commerce acted
contrary to law in refusing to revoke an antidumping duty order.
While the case was pending before the CIT, a WTO panel ruled
that Commerce's decision was inconsistent with U.S. obligations
under Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement. The Court held that
"[b]ecause Congress declined to enact procedures for revocation,
under the Charming Betsy doctrine, the Court must consider
whether Commerce formulated its regulation consistent with
50 For a more detailed analysis of the interplay between Chevron and the Charming
Betsy doctrine see Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, Interpreting International Trade Statutes:
Is the Charming Betsy Sinking?, 24 FORDHAM INVL L.J. 1533, 1547 (2001).
51 See Hyundai Elec. Corp. v. United States, 23 C.I.T. 302, 312 (1999) (quoting
Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("absent
express Congressional language to the contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to
conflict with international obligations")).
52 See Hyundai, 23 C.I.T. at 311 (discussing the binding effect of agency statute
construction).
53 Id. at 312 (citing URAA § 129).
54 See Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America v. United States, 18 C.I.T. 391,
414 (1994) ("political decisions balancing domestic and foreign interests were the
prerogative of the executive branch, not the courts.").
55 Hyundai, 23 C.I.T. at 312.
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Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement."56 The Court then
concluded that the authority given to Commerce to predict
whether revocation is likely to result in renewed dumping is not
inconsistent with the AD Agreement. Thus while the Court
considered whether Commerce's determination was inconsistent
with U.S. law on the basis that it violated a WTO Agreement, the
Court ultimately disagreed with the WTO panel and found that
there was no WTO violation. The Court stated that "unless the
conflict between an international obligation and Commerce's
interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear, a court should
take special care before it upsets Commerce's regulatory
authority under the Charming Betsy doctrine."57
This statement demonstrates a very cautious approach toward
application of the Charming Betsy doctrine, while still
recognizing the need at least to consider whether an AD or CVD
decision is consistent with the WTO Agreement, and therefore
consistent with U.S. law.
Only a handful of cases have considered the applicability of
WTO determinations at the CIT since Hyundai, and none of
them has fully clarified the exact level of deference or
consideration that will be given to WTO decisions. In
Government of Uzbekistan v. United States58 the Court did not
need to resolve the issue of whether or not the Department's
actions violated the AD Agreement because Commerce had not
even met the threshold requirement of providing sufficient
evidence of a non-de minimis margin.59 In Timken Company v.
United States60 the Court, in considering two WTO-based claims,
merely reiterated the broad standard announced in Hyundai,
that WTO panel reports are "non-binding decisions, the
reasoning of which may help inform this Court's decision." 61 One
of the two issues in Timken was the same as that in the Hot
Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, namely whether Commerce's
56 Id. at 313.
57 Id. at 313-14.
58 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 113 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 30, 2001).
59 Similarly, in China Steel Corp. v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2003) the Court distinguished the WTO decision relied upon by the respondent,
which, in turn, obviated the need to consider the precedential value of the WTO decision.
Id. at 1367-68.
60 240 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
61 Id., at 1239 (citing Hyundai, 23 C.I.T. at 312).
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arm's-length test was consistent with Article 2.1 of the AD
Agreement. 62 The Timken Court held that while Commerce's
application of the arm's-length test could be inconsistent with
U.S. international obligations, it had not been shown that the
arm's-length test, as applied to the plaintiff raising the issue, had
resulted in the inclusion of sales outside the ordinary course of
trade in the calculation of that party's margin.63
The other WTO issue in Timken, and the issue that has arisen
in each of the other cases that have come before the CIT since
Hyundai,64 regards the Department's practice, when calculating
weighted-average dumping margins, of setting the "negative
margins" 65 to zero. The EC's exercise of this practice, commonly
referred to as "zeroing", was found by the WTO Appellate Body to
violate the fair comparison requirement contained in Article 2.4
of the AD Agreement. 66 Relying on the WTO Ajpellate Body's
finding, plaintiffs in Timken, Corus Staal and PAM have
unsuccessfully argued that Commerce's practice of zeroing
negative margin transactions, violates U.S. international
obligations under the AD Agreement. Although it is telling that
the Court has repeatedly rejected the "zeroing" claim, of more
interest is the Court's reasoning in each of these cases.
In Timken, which was the first case in which this issue arose,
the Court, sidestepped the issue by distinguishing the EC - Bed
Linen Appellate Body Report on the bases that (1) the Court
could not determine whether the U.S. practice of zeroing was the
same as the EC practice of zeroing; and (2) the EC - Bed Linen
case involved an appeal from an antidumping investigation, not,
as in Timken, from an administrative review.67
62 See id. at 1236-37 (discussing arm's length test).
63 See id. at *1241-42 (discussing test with respect to agreement).
64 See Corus Staal BV v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003);
PAM, S.p.A v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
65 "Negative margins" occur in sales that are not dumped and represent the extent to
which the U.S. price exceeds normal value.
66 See European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India, WT/DS/141/ABR at 55, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDF
Documents/tWT/DS/141ABRW.doc (adopted Mar. 1, 2003 ) (finding that "a comparison
between export price and normal value that does not take fully into account the prices of
all comparable export transactions ... is not a 'fair comparison' between export price and
normal value, as required by Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2" (emphasis in original)) ("EC - Bed
Linen Appellate Body Report").
67 Timken, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
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In Corus Staal, however, the Court was unable to rely on the
latter reason for denying the claim, because the appeal to the
Court arose from an antidumping investigation. Rather than
merely claiming that it could not determine whether the U.S.
practice was the same as the EC practice, the Court in Corus
Staal, instead concluded that because "WTO decisions appear to
have very limited precedential value and are binding only upon
the particular countries involved",68 the Court could not "solely
rely upon [the WTO Appellate Body's] non-binding interpretation
of an international agreement as grounds to strike a United
States agency interpretation of a statute."69 Thus, the Court
appeared to hold that while the Court would consider an
Appellate Body decision, the Appellate Body decision alone could
never be the grounds upon which the CIT would overturn an
agency decision.
The Court in PAM went even further, essentially precluding
the operation of the Charming Betsy doctrine in all but the most
rare of cases. Although the Court acknowledged that the
reasoning contained in a WTO decision "may help to inform the
Court's decision"70, the Court held that because the AD
Agreement does not expressly prohibit zeroing, the Department's
zeroing practice "is not in such direct contradiction with an
international obligation of the United States" to merit "the
application of the Charming Betsy doctrine .... 71 Given,
however, that most international obligations do not list each and
every action that is prohibited, the Court's decision in PAM
effectively overrules the Charming Betsy doctrine except in cases
where the agency action violates an explicit prohibition in a WTO
agreement. Only future outings to the CIT will tell if the Court
intended to sideline the Charming Betsy doctrine in this manner.
Some comfort, however, can be drawn from these cases. In each
case (e.g., Timken, Corus Staal, and PAM) the CIT rejected the
Government's assertion that WTO panel decisions have no
bearing on CIT proceedings. The Government argued that the
plaintiffs were barred from claiming that Commerce has acted
inconsistently with a WTO agreement because 19 U.S.C. §
68 Corus Staal, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
69 Id.
70 PAM, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (citing Hyundai, 23 C.I.T. at 311).
71 Id. at 1373.
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3512(c)(1) provides that "no person other than the United
States... shall have any cause of action or defense under any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements." 72 In Uzbekistan the CIT
rejected the United States' reliance on this "erroneous technical
bar", holding that the plaintiffs were "not bringing an action
under any WTO agreement, and they are free to argue that
Congress would never have intended to violate an agreement it
generally intended to implement, without expressly saying so."73
Thus the CIT has expressly held that a plaintiff is free to argue,
pursuant to the Charming Betsy doctrine, that U.S. laws should
be construed and applied in a manner consistent with U.S.
international obligations under the AD Agreement. The question
is whether this freedom to raise a claim founded on an adverse
WTO panel report will eventually lead to the CIT holding that a
decision by Commerce or the ITC is inconsistent with the AD or
SCM Agreement, and is therefore contrary to U.S. law under the
Charming Betsy doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the choice of forum will depend on a number
of factors.
If time is of the essence to the plaintiff, then in principle, if not
always in practice, a NAFTA panel may be the forum of choice.
On the other hand, if the case involves issues that have already
been addressed by the CIT in a manner that is adverse to the
plaintiffs position, then an appeal to the CIT may be the only
way to obtain a favorable result through an appeal to the CAFC.
If the plaintiff is concerned not merely for the immediate case,
but also for future administrative reviews, then the CIT is the
better choice of forum. However, if the plaintiff would prefer to
have representatives from its country adjudicating the matter,
then the NAFTA panel would be the preferred forum.
Having selected the primary forum for raising the plaintiffs
claim, legal counsel to the plaintiff should seriously consider the
potential benefits of requesting the plaintiffs government to
initiate a WTO action. A plaintiff has little to lose and
72 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (2003).
73 Government of Uzbekistan v. United States, 2001 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 113, at
*12-*13.
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potentially much to gain in requesting its government to pursue
an appeal to the WTO that can proceed in tandem with the
plaintiffs own appeal to the CIT/NAFTA panel. Of course, the
plaintiff will need to persuade the foreign government that the
issue is of sufficient importance to the government to warrant a
WTO action.
Second, where a plaintiffs claim is that a U.S. statute is
inconsistent with the AD Agreement, the only forum in which a
plaintiff may be able to obtain relief is the WTO. Courts subject
to U.S. law have to apply U.S. law, regardless of how inconsistent
the U.S. statute may be with U.S. international obligations.
Conversely, the DSB, which is not constrained by deference to
U.S. law, is free to find that the statute in question is contrary to
the AD Agreement.
Finally, if the plaintiffs claim involves a challenge to
Commerce's or the ITC's application of the URAA, a decision by a
WTO panel or Appellate Body Report that is in the plaintiffs
favor may add weight to the plaintiffs case before the CIT, on
appeal to the CAFC, and in briefs to Commerce or the ITC in
future administrative proceedings. The degree to which U.S.
courts and agencies will apply or consider WTO decisions has not
been resolved. Although the CIT has proven reluctant to take up
this gauntlet, it has also been careful to note that it will, at a
minimum, consider a relevant WTO panel and/or Appellate
Body's report in reaching its own conclusion. Future cases may
provide an opportunity for a more extended cruise on the
Charming Betsy.
